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Animals live in visually complex environments. As a result, visual systems have evolved mechanisms that simplify visual processing and allow animals to focus on the information that is most relevant to adaptive decision making. This review explores two key mechanisms that animals use to efficiently process visual information: categorization and specialization. Categorization occurs when an animal's perceptual system sorts continuously varying stimuli into a set of discrete categories. Specialization occurs when particular classes of stimuli are processed using distinct cognitive operations that are not used for other classes of stimuli. We also describe a nonadaptive consequence of simplifying heuristics: visual illusions, where visual perception consistently misleads the viewer about the state of the external world or objects within it. We take an explicitly comparative approach by exploring similarities and differences in visual cognition across human and nonhuman taxa. Considering areas of convergence and divergence across taxa provides insight into the evolution and function of visual systems and associated perceptual strategies. 

Synopsis The term “cognitive template” originated from work in human-based cognitive science to describe a literal, stored, neural representation used in recognition tasks. As the study of cognition has expanded to nonhuman animals, the term has diffused to describe a wider range of animal cognitive tools and strategies that guide action through the recognition of and discrimination between external states. One potential reason for this nonstandardized meaning and variable employment is that researchers interested in the broad range of animal recognition tasks enjoy the simplicity of the cognitive template concept and have allowed it to become shorthand for many dissimilar or unknown neural processes without deep scrutiny of how this metaphor might comport with underlying neurophysiology. We review the functional evidence for cognitive templates in fields such as perception, navigation, communication, and learning, highlighting any neural correlates identified by these studies. We find that the concept of cognitive templates has facilitated valuable exploration at the interface between animal behavior and cognition, but the quest for a literal template has failed to attain mechanistic support at the level of neurophysiology. This may be the result of a misled search for a single physical locus for the “template” itself. We argue that recognition and discrimination processes are best treated as emergent and, as such, may not be physically localized within single structures of the brain. Rather, current evidence suggests that such tasks are accomplished through synergies between multiple distributed processes in animal nervous systems. We thus advocate for researchers to move toward a more ecological, process-oriented conception, especially when discussing the neural underpinnings of recognition-based cognitive tasks.